mebb.de
Iran-Krise

Richard N. Haass, als Präsident des Council of Foreign Relations unter den politischen Analytikern in den USA nur gut zwei Gewichtsklassen unter Henry Kissinger, schreibt in einem Aufsatz für die November/Dezember- Ausgabe von Foreign Affairs (sorry, noch nicht online), dass das amerikanische Zeitalter im Mittleren Osten beendet sei.

The age of U.S. dominance in the Middle East has ended and a new era in the modern history of the region has begun.

Er führt drei Belege an, warum die amerikanische Dominanz, die mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges begann, ihr Ende gefunden hat.

Die Wende sei eingeleitet worden durch die Entscheidung von George W. Bush jun., den Irak 2003 anzugreifen.

One casualty of the war has been a Sunni-dominated Iraq, which was strong enough and motivated enough to balance Shiite Iran. Sunni-Shiite tensions, dormant for a while, have come to the surface in Iraq and throughout the region. Terrorists have gained a base in Iraq and developed there a new set of techniques to export. Throughout much of the region, democracy has become associated with the loss of public order and the end of Sunni primacy. Anti-American sentiment, already considerable, has been reinforced. And by tying down a huge portion of the U.S. military, the war has reduced U.S. leverage worldwide.

Andere Faktoren kommen hinzu:

• der Niedergang des Nahost Friedensprozesses und der Verlust der amerikanischen Vermittlerrolle zwischen den arabischen Staaten und Israel

• das Unvermögen der arabischen Regierungen, den Einfluss radikaler Islamisten einzudämmen.

• die Globalisierung hat die Region für neue Ideen geöffnet und politisiert. Bilder von mishandelten Moslems im Irak, vom Leiden der Bevölkerung in Palästina und im Libanon, habe die Ablehnung der US Politik noch verstärkt.

In 12 Punkten entwirft Haass ein Szenarium, wie man sich die Zukunft im Mittleren Osten vorstellen muss – nicht ohne amerikanischen Einfluss, aber mit einer stark reduzierten US Rolle.

First, the United States will continue to enjoy more influence in the region than any other outside power, but its influence will be reduced from what it once was.

In unserem Zusammenhang ist die von Haass vorausgesagte Rolle des Irans von Interesse:

Iran will be one of the two most powerful states in the region. Those who have seen Iran as being on the cusp of dramatic internal change have been wrong. Iran enjoys great wealth, is the most powerful external influence in Iraq, and holds considerable sway over both Hamas and Hezbollah. It is a classic imperial power, with ambitions to remake the region in its image and the potential to translate its objectives into reality.

Einziger Gegenspieler in der Region ist Israel.

Israel will be the other powerful state in the region and the one country with a modern economy able to compete globally. The only state in the Middle East with a nuclear arsenal, it also possesses the region’s most capable conventional military force. But it still has to bear the costs of its occupation of the West Bank and deal with a multifront, multidimensional security challenge. Strategically speaking, Israel is in a weaker position today than it was before this summer’s crisis in Lebanon. And its situation will further deteriorate — as will that of the United States — if Iran develops nuclear weapons.

All dies, so Haass ergebe kein erfreuliches Bild, aber die Situation berge sowohl Möglichkeiten wie Gefahren.

An allererster Stelle nennt er die Notwendigkeit einer Abkehr von einer Politik, die sich vor allem auf die eigene militärische Stärke stützt.

The first mistake would be an overreliance on military force. As the United States has learned to its great cost in Iraq — and Israel has in Lebanon — military force is no panacea. It is not terribly useful against loosely organized militias and terrorists who are well armed, accepted by the local population, and prepared to die for their cause. Nor would carrying out a preventive strike on Iranian nuclear installations accomplish much good.

Zweiter Fehler: darauf zu bauen, dass im Mittleren Osten tatsächlich in naher Zukunft stabile Demokratien entstehen würden. Wenn überhaupt, dann ist dies ein Prozess von Jahrzehnten. Also habe man sich mit den Kräften zu arrangieren, die vorhanden sind.

Im Fall Iran ergibt sich laut Haass kaum eine andere Alternative als Diplomatie.

[S]ince regime change in Tehran is not a near-term prospect, military strikes against nuclear sites in Iran would be dangerous, and deterrence is uncertain, diplomacy is the best option available to Washington. The U.S. government should open, without preconditions, comprehensive talks that address Iran’s nuclear program and its support of terrorism and foreign militias. Iran should be offered an array of economic, political, and security incentives. It could be allowed a highly limited uranium-enrichment pilot program so long as it accepted highly intrusive inspections. Such an offer would win broad international support, a prerequisite if the United States wants backing for imposing sanctions or escalating to other options should diplomacy fail. Making the terms of such an offer public would increase diplomacy’s chances of success. The Iranian people should know the price they stand to pay for their government’s radical foreign policy. With the government in Tehran concerned about an adverse public reaction, it would be more likely to accept the U.S. offer.