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Iran-Krise

Die Prognose von IAEA Generaldirektor Mohammed ElBaradei, der Iran könne bis zum Endes Jahres über 8.000 Zentrifugen verfügen, stößt weiterhin auf Skepsis.

Vorgestern berichtete Mark Heinrichs für Reuters:

[S]ome diplomats and analysts query whether ElBaradei could really divine Iran’s nuclear advances — and indeed might be overstating them to nudge the West into a compromise he thinks is needed to avert U.S.-Iran war — given the IAEA’s declining knowledge about the extent of the programme.

Heinrich zitiert Mark Fitzpatrick vom IISS.

“For over 16 months now, the IAEA has had no access to the workshops where Iran was making centrifuges or to its stockpile of raw material,” said Mark Fitzpatrick, senior nuclear analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

“A year ago, IAEA sources estimated that Iran had enough components for 5,000 centrifuges. But many of them were breaking and other components would not pass quality control,” he said.

“If Iran can have 8,000 centrifuges in place by year end, it means Iran has succeeded again in evading export controls.”

Jeffrey Lewis zweifelt schon seit langem daran, ob die Zentrifugen so großartig funktionieren, wie uns der Iran glauben machen will.

Whether or not Iran keeps this pace, it seems that the Iranians are rushing to build large numbers of centrifuges that don’t work very well. …

That, to me, is very, very telling.

Iran—far from complying with UN Security Council demands for suspension—is racing, either for a bomb or to create “facts on the ground” that will present the United States and the EU-3 with a fait accompli.

Either way, Iran’s centrifuge program now seems driven by politics not technology.

Lewis hält es für möglich, dass der Iran sich ein Beispiel am pakistanischen Atomwaffenprogramm nimmt. Pakistan installierte in einem Crash-Programm zur Produktion des benötigten hochangereicherten Urans 14.000 Zentrifugen und nahm es in Kauf, dass während des Prozesses die meisten davon kaputt gingen. Am Ende blieben noch 1.000, aber die gewonnene Menge an angereichertem Uran reichte für den Bau der ersten Bombe aus.

The difference between Pakistan and Iran, of course, is that inspectors still have (limited) access to the Iran. If Iran starts churning out HEU with the current set of centrifuges, we’re likely to know before they have enough for a bomb.

At this point, Iran seems to be racing to create facts that will improve its bargaining power and, at a later, date give Tehran a bomb option.